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Abstract
Utterances like ‘Every guest didn’t leave’ are
ambiguous between a reading according to
which no guest left and a reading according
to which not all of the guests left. This am-
biguity is often explained by assuming that
‘every-not’ utterances have two different syn-
tactic parses. However, experimental studies
have shown that pragmatic factors, such as
prior probabilities and the question under dis-
cussion, also play an important role in the inter-
pretation of ambiguous ‘every-not’ utterances.
Recently, Scontras and Pearl (2020) put for-
ward a probabilistic model of ambiguity reso-
lution that makes it possible to quantify the rel-
ative contribution of syntactic and pragmatic
factors. Here, we present three experiments
aimed at testing this model and measuring the
division of labor between syntax and pragmat-
ics. Our results suggest that variability in the
interpretation of ‘every-not’ utterances can be
explained almost entirely in terms of pragmat-
ics, suggesting only a marginal role for syntax.
1 Introduction
Utterances containing ‘every’ and ‘not’ may be
ambiguous between two different readings:
(1) Every horse didn’t jump over the fence.
a. None of the horses jumped over the fence.
(‘none’ reading)
b. Not all horses jumped over the fence.
(‘not-all’ reading)
Under the ‘none’ reading, none of the horses
jumped over the fence. Under the ‘not-all’ reading,
it is not the case that every horse jumped over the
fence, though some may have.
This ambiguity can be explained by assuming
that utterances like (1) have two possible syntactic
0All materials and data can be found in the GitHub
repository of this project: https://github.com/linguistsherry/
qud-rsa-scil2021
parses. The surface scope parse corresponds to
the surface ordering of the words in the utterance,
and results in the ‘none’ reading given in (1a) (e.g.,
Carden, 1970). For the inverse scope parse, the
negation takes scope over the universal quantifier
rather than from its surface position, thus resulting
in the ‘not-all’ reading given in (1b).
It has been observed that the two readings of
(1) are not always equally accessible (e.g., Horn,
1989, p. 226–231). For example, Musolino (1998)
reported that upon hearing the utterance in (1) with-
out any context, 5-year old children generally ar-
rived at the ‘none’ reading, whereas adults over-
whelmingly favored the ‘not-all’ reading. Initially,
this difference was thought to show that children
only generate a subset of the syntactic parses that
adults do; in particular, it was thought that children
are unable to generate (or maintain in memory)
a parse that involves moving constituents out of
their surface positions. (Recall that the ‘not-all’
reading is assumed to involve the negation taking
scope above the quantifier, contrary to the linear
ordering.)
However, further evidence has shown that the
accessibility of the two readings is modulated by
pragmatic factors—both for children and adults.
One such factor is the question under discussion
(QUD) (e.g., Conroy et al., 2008; Gualmini et al.,
2008). The idea underlying the notion of QUD is
that discourse transpires with respect to an implicit
or explicit question. Any utterance in the discourse
should address this question in order to be pragmat-
ically felicitous (Roberts, 2012). This constraint
is also known as the question-answer requirement
(Gualmini et al., 2008).
To illustrate the potential effect of the question-
answer requirement on the interpretation of utter-
ances like (1), consider the following two QUDs:
(2) a. Did any of the horses jump over the fence?
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b. Did all of the horses jump over the fence?
The ‘every-not’ utterance in (1) only addresses the
‘any?’-QUD in (2a) if it receives its ‘none’ reading.
After all, on its ‘not-all’ reading, it could be that ei-
ther none or some but not all of the horses jumped
over the fence, so that the question is still unre-
solved. By contrast, in the case of the ‘all?’-QUD
in (2b), the ‘none’ reading provides an overinfor-
mative answer to the QUD, i.e., it conveys more
information than a simple ‘no’. Hence, it may be
hypothesized that the ‘all?’-QUD makes the ‘not-
all’ reading more salient, whereas the ‘any?’-QUD
makes the ‘none’ reading more salient.
In line with this hypothesis, Gualmini and col-
leagues (2008) found that 5-year old children were
able to access the ‘not-all’ reading when the ‘all?’-
QUD was made sufficiently salient. This finding
suggests that the aforementioned difference be-
tween children and adults in the interpretation of
‘every-not’ utterances is more likely to have a prag-
matic than syntactic source. For example, it could
be that children standardly assume an ‘any?’-QUD
while adults are able to consider different QUDs
and choose one that makes the utterance true on its
QUD-appropriate reading.
Another factor that has been argued to influence
the interpretation of ‘every-not’ utterances is lis-
teners’ prior expectations (Gualmini, 2004). For
example, it has been found that participants are
more likely to arrive at a ‘not-all’ reading of the
ambiguous utterance in (1) if it is a priori likely
that an ‘all’ situation holds, i.e., if it is likely that
all of horses jumped over the fence. This finding
can be explained by assuming that the probabil-
ity of the ‘all’ situation makes the utterance of the
‘every-not’ utterance contextually felicitous (Wa-
son, 1972). An alternative explanation more in
line with our framework is that listeners attempt
to have their interpretations differ minimally from
their prior expectations (Degen et al., 2015).
In summary, the traditional idea is that the two
readings of ‘every-not’ utterances are due to a syn-
tactic ambiguity. However, it has since become
clear that the accessibility of the readings is also
heavily dependent on pragmatic factors, such as
the QUD and prior expectations. It is still an open
question how much syntactic and pragmatic factors
impact the interpretation of ‘every-not’ utterances.
Thus, in this paper, we investigate the division of
labor between syntax and pragmatics.
To this end, we experimentally test Scontras and
Pearl’s (2020) computational model of ambiguity
resolution which uses both syntactic and pragmatic
factors as independent ingredients. In the next sec-
tion, we give a brief description of the model. Af-
terwards, we test the model on the basis of three
experiments in which we measured the salience
of different QUDs (Exp. 1), listeners’ prior expec-
tations about the state of the world (Exp. 2), and
their interpretation of ambiguous ‘every-not’ ut-
terances such as (1) (Exp. 3). Our results suggest
that the variability in the interpretation of ‘every-
not’ utterances can be explained almost entirely on
the basis of pragmatic factors, without assuming a
substantial explanatory role for syntax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2 we introduce Scontras and Pearl’s ambi-
guity resolution model; Section 3 provides details
of the experiments which measured human perfor-
mance; Section 4 discusses results from computa-
tional modelling; Section 5 concludes.
2 Computational model
To model our data, we make use of the ambiguity
resolution model formulated by Scontras and Pearl
(2020). Here, we provide a concise description
of the model. The interested reader is referred
to Scontras and Pearl (2020) for a more detailed
exposition (cf. also Savinelli et al., 2017, 2018).
The ambiguity resolution model proposed by
Scontras and Pearl is an extension of the more
general Rational Speech Acts (RSA) model (e.g.,
Frank and Goodman, 2012). The starting point of
the RSA model is the stipulation of a set of possible
messages M and a set of possible states S. In the
case at hand, Scontras and Pearl assume there are
just two possible messages: the ambiguous ‘every-
not’ utterance and a null message, i.e.:
M = {mevery-not,mnull}
Conceptually, the null message can be seen as repre-
senting messages that speakers may produce when-
ever the ambiguous ‘every-not’ utterance is unsat-
isfactory.
Scontras and Pearl assume there are three possi-
ble states, depending on the number of individuals
that satisfy the predicate (e.g., the number of horses
that jumped over the fence). For convenience, we
deviate notationally from Scontras and Pearl, and
assume that the states indicate whether none, some
but not all, or all of the individuals satisfy the pred-
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icate, i.e.:
S = {snone, ssome, sall}
(Note that ‘some’ in ssome should be interpreted as
‘some but not all’ rather than receiving its logical
interpretation of ‘at least some and possibly all’.)
Next, Scontras and Pearl provide a semantics
for the two messages. The null message is always
true. The truth value of the ambiguous ‘every-not’
utterance depends on the scopal relation between
the quantifier and the negation. To model syntactic
scope, Scontras and Pearl assume that each mes-
sage is indexed with a scope parameter i. This
parameter indicates whether the message receives
a surface scope parse (i = surface) or an inverse
scope parse (i = inverse). The semantics of the
two messages is then defined as follows (we omit
the scope parameter for the null message because
it is inconsequential there):
Jmsurfaceevery-notK = λs . s = snone
Jminverseevery-notK = λs . s 6= sall
JmnullK = λs . s = s
Lastly, Scontras and Pearl assume that messages
are produced and interpreted relative to a question
under discussion (QUD). Scontras and Pearl distin-
guish three QUDs, asking whether all individuals
satisfy the predicate (qall?), whether any of the indi-
viduals satisfy the predicate (qany?), and how many
individuals satisfy the predicate (qhow-many?), i.e.,
Q = {qall?, qany?, qhow-many?}
The QUD maps each state to an answer x, which
can be the state itself (for qhow-many?) or a truth
value (for qall? and qany?). The three QUDs thus
have the following semantics:
Jqall?K = λs . s = sall
Jqany?K = λs . s 6= snone
Jqhow-many?K = λs . s
Based on the foregoing, we may define a literal
listener L0 who infers an answer x to the QUD q
given a message m and a scope assignment i by
determining, for each state, the truth value of x in
that state relative to q multiplied by the truth value
of the message m in that state relative to the scope
assignment i, and then summing over those values:
PL0(x |m, i, q) ∝
∑
s
(JqK(s) = x) · JmiK(s)
For example, suppose that m = mevery-not, i =
surface, and q = qall?. The probability that L0
infers a confirmatory answer to the QUD in this
case is proportional to the sum of 1 (since in snone
the answer to the QUD is confirmatory and the
message is true), 0 (since in ssome the answer to
the QUD is confirmatory but the message is false
given the surface scope parse), and 0 (since in sall
the answer to the QUD is negative and the message
is false), i.e., 1. In other words, L0 necessarily
infers a confirmatory answer, which is intuitively
correct.
Next, Scontras and Pearl define a speaker S1
who chooses messages with a probability that is
proportional to the probability that L0 infers the
correct answer to the QUD, as follows:
PS1(m | s, i, q) ∝ exp(α · log(PL0(x |m, i, q)))
Here, the α parameter modulates the probability
that S1 chooses the optimal message, i.e., the one
for which L0 is most likely to infer the correct
answer. The probability is soft-maxed by taking
the exponential.
Based on this speaker, Scontras and Pearl define
a pragmatic listener L1 who infers a state, scope
assignment, and QUD from a message based on
the probability that S1 would produce that message
given that state, scope assignment, and QUD. Im-
portantly, the pragmatic listener also takes into con-
sideration the prior probability of the state, scope
assignment, and QUD:
PL1(s, i, q |m) ∝ PS1(u|s, i, q)·P (s)·P (i)·P (q)
Scontras and Pearl further define a pragmatic
speaker S2 who produces messages depending on
the behaviour of L1. However, here we are con-
cerned with language interpretation, so we will
ignore this speaker.
We wish to emphasize that, in Scontras and
Pearl’s model, the syntactic parse constrains but
does not determine listeners’ interpretation. For ex-
ample, participants who arrive at an inverse scope
parse will still infer the ‘none’ situation with a cer-
tain probability. Perhaps more surprisingly, partici-
pants who arrive at a surface scope parse will still
infer the ‘some but not all’ situation with a certain
probability insofar as the ‘all?’-QUD is relevant,
since the distinction between the ‘none’ situation
and the ‘some but not all’ situation is irrelevant
(and therefore collapses) for that QUD. Hence, it is
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important to clearly distinguish the syntactic parses
from listeners’ interpretation.
Scontras and Pearl’s model gives quantitative
predictions about listeners’ interpretation of am-
biguous ‘every-not’ utterances. These predictions
depend inter alia on three model-external factors:
(i) the prior probability of each state P (s), (ii) the
probability of each scope assignment P (i), and (iii)
the probability of each QUD P (q). We tested the
model predictions by measuring participants’ in-
terpretation of ambiguous ‘every-not’ utterances,
as well as their prior expectations about the QUD
and state. Note that there is no straightforward
way of measuring prior expectations about scope
assignment—we explore different possibilities in
the ‘Model evaluation’ section.
3 Experiments
To test how adult speakers interpret utterances such
as (1), we constructed 72 short stories while sepa-
rately manipulating the prior probability and biases
toward certain types of QUDs. A set of sample
stimuli can be found in Table 1.
The stories were constructed as follows. First,
we constructed 24 stories that intuitively varied in
which state of the world was most likely: 8 stories
made the ‘none’ situation likely, 8 stories made
the ‘some’ situation likely, and 8 stories made the
‘all’ situation likely. Second, we expanded each
story with one of three QUD-biasing sentences: 1
sentence made the ‘any?’-QUD likely, 1 sentence
made the ‘how-many?’-QUD likely, and 1 sentence
made the ‘all?’-QUD likely. Third, we expanded
each story with an ambiguous ‘every-not’ utterance
made by one of the characters. These utterances
always had the negation contracted to the verb (e.g.,
‘hasn’t’ rather than ‘has not’).
We conducted 3 experiments: Exp. 1 tested par-
ticipants’ prior expectations about the state of the
world for each story, Exp. 2 tested participants’ in-
tuitions about the salience of different QUDs for
each story. The results of these two experiments are
used to parametrize the models. Exp. 3 probed par-
ticipants’ interpretation of ‘every-not’ utterances.
All experiments were held on IbexFarm (Drum-
mond, 2013), and each experiment has 45 partici-
pants recruited via Prolific. Statistical analysis and
modelling was carried out using R (R Core Team,
2017)
3.1 Experiment 1: Situation priors
Exp. 1 measured the prior probabilities of the
‘none’, ‘some but not all’, and ‘all’ situations. 45
participants were presented with 24 short stories, in
which we manipulated whether the ‘none’, ‘some
but not all’, or ‘all’ situation was intuitively more
likely. The stories were presented without the sen-
tence that made one of the QUDs salient, and with-
out the ambiguous ‘every-not’ utterance. Partici-
pants had to rate the prior probability of each situa-
tion by moving continuous sliders. The complete
experiment can be accessed at http://spellout.net/
ibexexps/qud-project/prior list1/experiment.html.
Fig. 1 shows the ratings for the prior probabilities
of the three situations, depending on our intuitive
classification. It can be seen that participants’ rat-
ings generally followed our intuitions. However,
participants had an overall strong preference for
the ‘some but not all’ situation, perhaps because
that was the least extreme option. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the ratings for the ‘none’ situation were
the highest for the stories that we intuitively clas-
sified as making that situation most likely, and the
same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the ratings for
the ‘some but not all’ and ‘all’ situations.
None−prior Some−prior All−prior











Figure 1: Raw ratings for the prior probability of each
state (Exp. 1). The different facets refer to our intuitive
classification.
3.2 Experiment 2: QUD salience
Exp. 2 measured the salience of the ‘any?’, ‘all?’,
and ‘how-many?’ QUDs. 45 participants were
presented with 24 (out of 72 in total) short sto-
ries, which made one of the three QUDs intuitively
salient. The story selection was varied across 3
lists. The stories were presented without the am-
biguous ‘every-not’ utterance. Participants had to
rate the salience of each QUD by moving contin-
uous sliders. The complete experiment can be ac-
cessed at http://spellout.net/ibexexps/qud-project/
qud list1/experiment.html.
Fig. 2 shows the ratings for the salience of the
three QUDs, depending on our intuitive classifica-
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All-prior Some-prior None-prior
Context Rachel is an industrious teach-
ing assistant who has to grade
student essays. After a week,
her boss asks. . .
Barney has been submitting
recipes to a famous cooking
website for some time now.
His partner asked. . .
Jack is an incompetent homi-
cide detective trying to solve
three recent murders. His boss
tells him that. . .
All?-QUD if she is ready to enter the
grades into the school system.
whether all of his submissions
had been posted on the web-
site.
he will have to look for a new




how much progress she’s made
so far.
how successful his submis-
sions had been.
he will get a bonus depending
on his performance.
Any? QUD if she has already started grad-
ing the essays.
whether any of his submissions
had even been posted on the
website.
the newspapers will be all over




Rachel says: Every essay
hasn’t been graded.
Barney says: Every submis-
sion hasn’t been published.
Jack says: Every case hasn’t
been solved.
Table 1: Sample stimuli from Exps. 1–3
tion. It can be seen that participants’ ratings fol-
lowed our intuitions, i.e., the ‘any?’-QUD was most
salient for the stories that we intuitively thought
would make that QUD most salient, and the same
holds, mutatis mutandis, for the other two QUDs.
Any?−QUD Many?−QUD All?−QUD











Figure 2: Raw ratings for the salience of each QUD
(Exp. 2). The different facets refer to our intuitive clas-
sification.
However, the QUD was also influenced by prior
expectations about the state of the world, as shown
in Fig. 3. That is, participants were more likely
to rate the ‘any?’-QUD as salient if the ‘none’ sit-
uation was a priori more likely. Similarly, par-
ticipants were more likely to rate the ‘all?’-QUD
as salient if the ‘all’ situation was a priori more
likely. This interdependence makes intuitively
sense: when certain situations are very likely, any
deviations from those situations thereby become
highly relevant, and thus a potential QUD.
However, it is important to note that the notions
of prior probabilities and QUD salience were not
completely equivalent. To illustrate, Fig. 4 shows
the salience ratings of each QUD plotted for each
of our intuitive classifications about both QUD
salience and prior expectations. This figure shows,
e.g., that when the ‘any?’-QUD was salient accord-
ing to our intuitions, the ‘any?’-QUD was indeed
None−prior Some−prior All−prior











Figure 3: Raw ratings for the salience of each QUD
(Exp. 2). The different facets refer to our intuitive clas-
sification about prior expectations.
rated highest for all prior expectation conditions,
though this effect was most prominent when the






































Figure 4: Raw ratings for the salience of each QUD
(Exp. 2). The different facets refer to our intuitive clas-
sification about prior expectations and QUD salience.
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3.3 Experiment 3: Resolving scope ambiguity
Exp. 3 tested participants’ interpretation of am-
biguous ‘every-not’ utterances. 45 participants
were presented with 24 (out of 72) short sto-
ries. The story selection was varied across 3
lists. Each story ended with one of the charac-
ters producing an ‘every-not’ utterance. Partici-
pants had to indicate their interpretation of this
utterance by rating the probability of the ‘none’,
‘some but not all’, and ‘all’ situations, given the
speaker’s utterance. The experiment can be ac-
cessed at http://spellout.net/ibexexps/qud-project/
scope list1/experiment.html.
Overall, in line with prior research, participants
gave higher ratings to the ‘some but not all’ situa-
tion than to the ‘none’ situation (77 vs. 39). Indeed,
for only 5 (of the 72) items did participants on av-
erage assign a higher rating to the ‘none’ situation
than to the ‘some but not all’ situation. This ob-
servation already foreshadows the conclusion that
participants had an overwhelming preference for
an inverse scope parse of the target utterance. Fur-
ther in line with expectations, the ‘all’ situation, in
which the ‘every-not’ utterance was false on both
of its readings, only received a very low rating (5).
Fig. 5 shows the ratings for the ‘some but not all’
situation plotted alongside the prior probability rat-
ings from Exp. 1 and the QUD salience ratings
from Exp. 2. The ratings for the ‘some but not all’
situation are interesting because they conclusively
show that participants arrived at a ‘not-all’ interpre-
tation of the ambiguous ‘every-not’ utterance.
Fig. 5 shows that ratings for the ‘some but not
all’ situation (i.e., endorsements of the ‘not-all’
reading) increase when the ‘all’ situation is a priori
more likely and, less forcefully, when the ‘some’
situation is a priori more likely. Conversely, ratings
for the ‘some but not all’ situation decrease when
the ‘none’ situation was rated as a priori more likely.
In line with prior research, participants gave higher
ratings to the ‘some but not all’ situation when
the ‘all?’-QUD was more salient, and lower ratings
when the ‘any?’-QUD was more salient. There was
no noticeable effect of the salience of the ‘how-
many?’-QUD on the ratings for the ‘some but not
all’ situation.
4 Model evaluation
The goal of this paper is to evaluate how accurately
Scontras and Pearl’s ambiguity resolution model
captures the way participants in Exp. 3 interpreted
None−prior Some−prior All−prior




















(a) Correlation between the rating for the ‘some but not all’
situation (Exp. 3) and the ratings for prior probabilities of the
three situations (Exp. 1).
Any?−QUD Many?−QUD All?−QUD




















(b) Correlation between the rating for the ‘some but not all’
situation (Exp. 3) and the ratings for QUD salience of the three
possible QUDs (Exp. 2).
Figure 5: Correlation between the rating for the ‘some
but not all’ situation (Exp. 3) and the results of Exps. 1
and 2.
‘every-not’ utterances. However, we also want to
measure the relative contribution of each of the
components of the model, i.e., prior expectations
about the state of the world, the question under
discussion (QUD), and syntactic scope. With the
latter goal in mind, we tested both the full ambi-
guity resolution model Lfull (i.e., Scontras and
Pearl’s pragmatic listener L1) and four models that
systematically nullified the effect of one of the com-
ponents, as follows:
• LnoPrior did not take into account prior prob-
abilities over possible states (Exp. 1).
• LnoQUD did not take into account the QUD
(Exp. 2).
• Lsurface always assigned surface scope.
• Linverse always assigned inverse scope.
The ambiguity resolution model associates
‘every-not’ utterances with (inter alia) a probability
distribution over possible states of the world, de-
pending on prior expectations about the state of the
world, the QUD, and the syntactic scope. To obtain
predictions from the model, we parametrized these
components on the basis of the results of Exp. 1
(prior expectations about the state of the world) and
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Exp. 2 (salience of the QUD). In line with Scontras
and Pearl, we assume that the models consider both
syntactic scopes equiprobable, except of course for
the Lsurface and Linverse models which always
converged on one of both scope options.
Thus, we generated, for each short story and for
each model, a probability distribution over possible
states of the world (i.e., snone, ssome, and sall). To
obtain a quantitative measure of model fit, we cal-
culated, for each model, three correlations. First,
we calculated the mean correlation between predic-
tions and normalized data for each item. Second,
we calculated the mean correlation between predic-
tions and normalized data for each possible state
of the world. Third, we calculated the overall cor-
relation between predictions and normalized data.
The three correlations are shown in Table 2. Fig. 6
visualizes the overall correlation for each model.
The correlations between predictions and data
for the full model are generally quite high. The
only exception is the per state correlation, which
lies slightly below 0.4. Note, however, that this
correlation was skewed down because the model
made relatively poor predictions about the variabil-
ity in the ratings for the ‘all’ situation, in which
the ‘every-not’ utterance was false. (Note that the
model assigns some probability to that state in case
the ‘any?’-QUD is highly salient.)
surface inverse
full noPrior noQUD
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1




















Some but not all
All
Figure 6: Scatterplot of predictions and data for each
item, state of the world, and ambiguity resolution
model.
The results indicate that prior expectations about
the state of the world are highly relevant, as the
correlation drops from .67 to .34 once these are
removed from the model. By contrast, the effect of
QUD is only marginal: removing this factor from
the model reduces the correlation from .67 to .65.
A model that always assigned a surface scope parse
performed poorly in comparison to the full model
in which both scope options were deemed equiprob-
able. Interestingly, however, the model that always
assigned an inverse scope parse outperformed all
other ambiguity resolution models—including the
full model.
To confirm whether the optimal model was in-
deed one in which the ‘every-not’ utterance un-
ambiguously received an inverse scope parse, we
formulated a model with scope preference as a free
parameter, and subsequently optimized this model.
The result of this analysis confirmed that the opti-
mal model was one with an invariant preference for
inverse scope. In other words, the optimal model
was one that completely ignored the possibility of
a surface scope parse of the sentence.
Scontras and Pearl conclude that “pragmatic fac-
tors play a larger role than grammatical processing
factors” (p. 1) in explaining the interpretation of
‘every-not’ utterances. Our results suggest an even
bolder claim: the way people interpret ‘every-not’
utterances is exhaustively shaped by pragmatic fac-
tors (i.e., the QUD and, especially, prior expecta-
tions about the state of the world) rather than by
their vaccillation between different syntactic parses.
More specifically, our results suggest that English
language users consistently assign an inverse scope
parse to ‘every-not’ utterance.
5 General discussion
In this paper, we experimentally investigated listen-
ers’ interpretation of ambiguous ‘every-not’ utter-
ances, such as ‘Every horse didn’t jump over the
fence’. Such utterances are ambiguous between a
‘none’ reading (‘None of the horses jumped over
the fence’) and a ‘not-all’ reading (‘Not all horses
jumped over the fence’). In particular, we stud-
ied how listeners’ interpretation of such utterances
is influenced by their prior expectations about the
state of the world and by the question under discus-
sion (QUD).
To computationally model the data, we made
use of the ambiguity resolution model described by
Scontras and Pearl (2020) (cf. also Savinelli et al.,
2017, 2018). This model assumes that listeners’
interpretations of ambiguous utterances are shaped
by (i) their syntactic parse, (ii) their prior expecta-
tions about the state of the world, and (iii) the QUD.
We parametrized the factors in (ii) and (iii) based
on experimental data. Scontras and Pearl’s model
generally offered a fair approximation of the actual
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Lfull LnoPrior LnoQUD Lsurface Linverse
per item .82 .42 .81 .54 .88
per state .39 .22 .34 .31 .36
overall .78 .39 .79 .48 .85
average .67 .34 .65 .45 .70
Table 2: Correlations between data from Exp. 3 and predictions for each ambiguity resolution model. The optimal
correlation is marked in green.
data. Interestingly, model comparison indicated
that participants’ interpretation was mostly shaped
by their prior expectations, and only marginally by
the QUD, which goes against remarks made in the
literature (e.g., Gualmini et al., 2008).
However, we also observed an interaction be-
tween prior expectations and QUD salience. Such
an interaction makes intuitive sense. For example,
if it is extremely unlikely that any of the horses
jumped over the fence, the QUD ‘Did any of the
horses jump over the fence?’ thereby becomes
more salient. Conversely, if someone asks ‘Did
all of the horses jump over the fence?’, a state of
the world in which all of the horses jumped over
the fence thereby becomes more likely, since it is
entertained as a real possibility by a presumably
rational questioner. It is possible, then, that prior
evidence for the effects of QUD may have been
confounded by effects of prior expectations about
the state of the world. Scontras and Pearl’s model
assumes that prior expectations and the QUD are
completely independent: our results call that as-
sumption into question.
A second main finding from the model evalua-
tion is that the data was best described by a model
that did not assume that ‘every-not’ utterances are
ambiguous at the syntactic level. The optimal
model always assigned an inverse scope parse, ac-
cording to which the negation was moved out of its
surface position to take scope over the quantifier.
The data was thus best described by a model that
only made use of pragmatic cues.
There are two ways of interpreting this finding.
The first is by concluding that ‘every-not’ utter-
ances receive an inverse scope parse by default,
and that their apparent ambiguity is wholly deter-
mined by pragmatic factors. However, it could also
be that there is an interdependence between syntac-
tic scope and the pragmatic factors that we tested.
For example, it could be that prior expectations
about the state of the world shape listeners’ inter-
pretation indirectly by making one syntactic parse
more available. The computational model that we
tested does not factor in such potential interactions
between syntax and pragmatics, as it includes these
ingredients as completely independent factors. We
leave for future work the suggestion of developing
a model that also takes into consideration possible
interdependencies between the various pragmatic
and syntactic cues.
In any case, we do not necessarily want to argue
that ‘every-not’ utterances lack any syntactic am-
biguity. Indeed, ongoing research by Ira Noveck
and Kazuko Yatsushiro suggests substantial cross-
linguistic differences in the accessibility of the two
readings for ‘every-not’ utterances. Such findings
are reminiscent of earlier disputed arguments that
the interpretation of ‘every-not’ utterances in En-
glish systematically varies across dialects (e.g., Car-
den, 1970; Baltin, 1974; Horn, 1989). Intuitively,
such differences are more likely to be structural
than pragmatic in nature. For example, it seems un-
likely that Dutch participants tended to imagine dif-
ferent QUDs than French participants. Therefore,
here we merely claim that participants’ interpreta-
tion of these sentences can be modelled largely in
terms of pragmatics rather than syntax.
What complicates matters is that the model has
a number of free parameters that have important
effects on the model comparisons. One such free
parameter is the rationality parameter α that is stan-
dardly set to 1. Another free parameter is the set
of alternatives. We followed Scontras and Pearl
in assuming that the only alternative to the ‘every-
not’ utterance is a null message that is always true.
Scontras and Pearl’s motivation for this decision
is that participants in experiments often only see
‘every-not’ utterances. Indeed, this was also the
case in our experiment. Still, it seems that the
‘every-not’ utterance itself can already make cer-
tain alternatives salient. For example, it is often
assumed that an utterance like ‘Every horse didn’t
jump over the fence’ competes with the simpler
‘No horse jumped over the fence’ (Horn, 1989, p.
226ff.). Indeed, various authors have argued that
the relative accessibility of the inverse scope parse
compared to the surface scope parse (at least in En-
glish) is due to the ‘no’ utterance offering a simpler
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way of conveying the reading corresponding to a
surface scope parse. Similarly, a classic observa-
tion is that negated sentences generally make their
positive counterparts salient (e.g., Wason, 1972).
Exploratory analyses where we included ‘no’ utter-
ances and ‘every’ utterances as alternatives suggest
a larger role for syntax compared to the analyses
presented in this paper. However, before drawing
any firm conclusions, one will need to find a way to
determine which alternatives (if any) participants
take into consideration when they interpret ‘every-
not’ utterances.
The prominence of pragmatic factors calls for
a re-evaluation of some of the key findings from
the literature. Perhaps the most widely discussed
observation is that in null contexts children tend
to arrive at a ‘none’ reading whereas adults prefer
the ‘not-all’ reading (Musolino, 1998; Gualmini
et al., 2008). Initially, this difference was taken
to indicate that children are only able to access
the ‘none’ reading. However, Gualmini and col-
leagues (2008) later showed that children can in
fact arrive at a ‘not-all’ reading if the QUD tar-
gets whether or not, e.g., all of the horses jumped
over the fence. This finding has been interpreted
as evidence that children may access an inverse
scope parse. However, Scontras and Pearl’s com-
putational model—validated by our data—shows
that a ‘not-all’ reading may in fact emerge from a
surface scope parse if certain pragmatic constraints
are satisfied, e.g., if the QUD asks whether all of
the horses jumped over the fence and if a situation
where none of the horses jumped over the fence
is unlikely. Hence, it could be that the difference
between children and adults is more reflective of
a difference in how they contextualize the target
utterances.
Similarly, Syrett and colleagues (2014) observed
that prosody can steer listeners to either a ‘none’
or ‘not-all’ reading. They interpreted this finding
as showing that prosody can steer listeners’ syn-
tactic parsing to either a surface scope or inverse
scope parse. As Syrett and colleagues acknowl-
edge, however, it is well known that prosody also
helps listeners to select the most plausible QUD
(e.g., Kadmon and Roberts, 1986). While Syrett
and colleagues controlled for prior probabilities,
some of their results may be explained based on
the assumption that the prosodic manipulations (to
the extent that they were effective) determined the
most likely QUD rather than which syntactic parse
to choose—assuming, as before, that these factors
work largely independently. This alternative expla-
nation might also account for the observation that
prosody only has a relatively mild effect on how
people disambiguated utterances with a quantifica-
tional ambiguity.
The more general conclusion from our study is
that many of the experimental findings on ‘every-
not’ utterances may be amenable to a purely
pragmatic explanation, without having to assume
that listeners routinely alternate between syntactic
parses. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, it is
necessary to carry out experiments that control for
pragmatic factors, and to formally evaluate whether
it is necessary to postulate differences in the acces-
sibility of the syntactic parses. Such an ambitious
enterprise must be left to future research.
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